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Since entering the global agenda in the mid-1990s, adaptation to climate change has moved from being considered a largely
technical and environmental issue to one rooted in more social and economic circumstances of vulnerable populations.
However, research into adaptation has been scarce in terms of analysing power and the politics that in conjunction with
socio-economic factors often determine how people in local communities in the Global South respond to climate change.
In light of these considerations, the aim of this paper is to contribute to the wider effort to politicize adaptation to climate
change research and, as a result, democratize adaptation policy and practice. It is argued that any kind of social
vulnerability to climate change is, in essence, political. Once understood as a political process, adaptation should be
studied critically by interrogating the local power structures and the resulting political inequalities that determine people’s
ability to benefit from programmes and projects that aim to facilitate local adaptation. This is necessary if such
interventions are to avoid benefitting some while leaving others, and particularly the poor and marginalized, behind.
Democratization is seen as a process that must occur (1) between communities and interventions, and (2) within local
communities, themselves. The paper concludes with reflections on how democratizing adaptation could function in theory
and practice.
Keywords: adaptation; climate change; vulnerability; power; democratization; politicization; community-based adaptation;
CBA
Introduction
Since entering the global agenda in the mid-1990s, adap-
tation to climate change has moved from being con-
sidered a largely technical and environmental issue to
one rooted in more social and economic circumstances
of vulnerable populations (Mertz, Halsnæs, Olesen, &
Rasmussen, 2009; Orlove, 2009; Pelling, 2011).
Researchers and practitioners alike seem to be embracing
the idea that exposure to biophysical climate impacts such
as droughts, floods, or sea-level rise determined by geo-
graphical location alone is not the only factor affecting
people’s vulnerability in the face of climate change.
Socio-economic factors such as poverty, health, edu-
cation, living conditions, access to financial markets and
technologies are also believed to play a crucial, if not
decisive, role in how people respond to these natural
forces (Adger, Huq, Brown, Conway, & Hulme, 2003;
Ayers & Dodman, 2010; OECD, 2012; UNDESA,
2005). The realization that natural disasters are severe
only to the extent that the affected populations are vulner-
able to them is not new (Ribot, 1995; Ribot, Magalhães,
& Panagides, 1996; Sen, 1981; Watts & Bohle, 1993;
Wisner, 2004), and is slowly establishing itself within
climate change adaptation literature. This is certainly
welcome and will contribute to a more nuanced under-
standing of adaptation outcomes. Moreover, it has also
allowed adaptation to permanently cross paths with sus-
tainable and inclusive development, with which it is
believed to have mutual objectives (Adger, Brooks,
Bentham, Agnew, & Eriksen, 2004; Ayers & Dodman,
2010; Fankhauser & Schmidt-Traub, 2011; Mertz et al.,
2009; Oppenheimer, 2013; Pokorny, de Jong, Godar,
Pacheco, & Johnson, 2013; Ramirez-Villegas, Salazar,
Jarvis, & Navarro-Racines, 2012; Rayner & Malone,
2001; Ribot, 2009; Schilling, Freier, Hertig, & Scheffran,
2012; Thomas & Twyman, 2005).
However, research into how adaptation works on the
ground is still largely limited (Ford et al., 2015), and has
been particularly scarce in terms of analysing power and
the politics that often determine how people in local com-
munities in the Global South respond to climate change.1
Most existing research does not push analytical boundaries
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or
built upon in any way.
*Email: michal.mikulewicz@manchester.ac.uk
Climate and Development, 2018
Vol. 10, No. 1, 18–34, https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2017.1304887
beyond explicitly socio-economic – rather than political –
contexts of the studied localities. Similarly, interventions
tend to include institutional solutions based on the
notions of collective action, community cohesion and inter-
action, as well as norms, rules, and trust (often described as
social capital), or economic ones that stress the importance
of technology and market access. While these measures
may have the potential to contribute to increased “resili-
ence” of the affected communities (see, Uphoff, 2000),
research suggests that the way such processes operate is
rarely egalitarian, and that their benefits are often distribu-
ted unequally (Chen, Wang, & Huang, 2014; Hiraldo,
2015; Jennings, 2011; Magrath, 2010; Marfo, 2015;
Marino & Ribot, 2012; McCarthy, 2014; Oyono &
Galuak, 2015; Taylor, 2014). A number of critical scholars
have cautioned that interventions aimed at increasing local
communities’ adaptive capacity in developing contexts
may lead to the emergence of winners and losers of adap-
tation, with the potential to exacerbate local inequalities
and thus hinder inclusive development (Adger, 2006;
Adger et al., 2003; Thomas & Twyman, 2005). Conse-
quently, there have been consistent calls to politicize adap-
tation through a more systematic and focused incorporation
of power into research and practice (Dodman & Mitlin,
2013; Eriksen, Nightingale, & Eakin, 2015; Marino &
Ribot, 2012; Symons, 2014; Taylor, 2014). For these criti-
cal scholars, the exercise of power by actors across multiple
scales is seen as a key determinant of unequal adaptation to
climate impacts.
Building upon these considerations, the aim of this paper
is to contribute to the wider effort to politicize adaptation to
climate change research and, as a result, democratize adap-
tation policy and practice. It is argued that vulnerability,
rather than being described using socio-economic indicators
such as high poverty, low levels of education, or lacking or
otherwise unstable access to land, needs to be analysed in
terms of its origin (Ribot, 2014). Doing so reveals that vul-
nerability is, in essence, political. Conceptualizing vulner-
ability in terms of political power is necessary to
supplement the current debates around adaptation to
climate change in local communities, which do not place suf-
ficient attention to local power inequalities. By addressing
this gap in understanding local adaptive responses, it is
hoped that a focus on the political nature of vulnerability
in the face of climate change can help steer the direction
of adaptation research and practice towards more equitable
climate policies and outcomes in the future.
This paper is structured into four major parts. First, an
overview of the existing approaches to adaptation interven-
tions is discussed, which groups them according to two
dimensions: the cause of the damage addressed (the
hazards approach vs. the vulnerability approach) and the
modality in which such interventions are implemented
(top-down and bottom-up). The second part provides a
brief critique of the current approaches and is based on
the relative absence of power considerations both in
hazards- and vulnerability-centred research and practice.
In response to this critique, the third part argues that vulner-
ability to climate change impacts is a result of an explicitly
political process. By doing so, it seeks to complement the
currently dominant social vulnerability approach by dis-
cussing how power, understood as the ability to success-
fully influence the actions and subjectivities of others
(Brennan & Israel, 2008) through both material and discur-
sive strategies, can be used to explain the root causes of
vulnerability and inform adaptation interventions in a
way that, at the very least, they do not ignore or exacerbate
the existing social inequalities at the local level. In the
fourth part, democratization of adaptation is discussed, in
which it is argued that interventions need to be democra-
tized in such a way as to obtain two major outcomes.
First, the relationship between the interventions and the
communities should be reconsidered with more tangible
power being delegated to communities. Second, equitable
adaptation is considered possible only if the distribution
of power in the process of adaptation decision-making
and implementation is spread evenly among all community
members. This last part of the paper concludes with a brief
discussion on the practicalities of adopting a more political
approach to adaptation, including potential methodologies
for further empirical study.
Brief overview of approaches to adaptation
interventions
Adaptation research has identified a range of approaches
that practitioners have adopted to reduce the vulnerability
of local communities to damage associated with climate
change events. A review of adaptation literature has pro-
duced a typology that demonstrates where current adap-
tation research and practice both stand. It is possible to
identify two dimensions in this regard. The first dimension
of this typology concerns the source of damage that an
intervention is aimed to address. Adaptation interventions
have followed the hazards approach, the social vulner-
ability approach, or a combination of the two. This dimen-
sion is more theoretical, as interventions do not always
explicitly indicate the cause of damage they seek to
address. The second dimension, and a more practical one
by nature, concerns the modality in which action is being
taken, namely top-down, bottom-up, or autonomous.
While the first two apply to cases where communities
receive external adaptation assistance, autonomous strat-
egies are those taken by community members indepen-
dently of any outside intervention, and thus will not be
discussed in greater detail here. As it will be explained
below, both these dimensions (the cause of damage
addressed and the modality in which it is done) are intrin-
sically related. For instance, research suggests that the
hazards approach tends to favour top-down interventions,
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while the social vulnerability approach recognizes the need
for bottom-up adaptation strategies (Ayers & Forsyth,
2009; Bassett & Fogelman, 2013). In simple terms, the pro-
posed typology is concerned with the source of damage that
adaptation interventions address, as well as how they
address it.
The hazards approach and the social vulnerability
approach
Adaptation and vulnerability are two strictly interrelated
concepts, and it can be argued that, broadly speaking, the
objective of adaptation to climate change is to reduce vul-
nerability to climate change impacts. At the same time, vul-
nerability greatly affects how adaptation unfolds. Itself a
somewhat misused term, vulnerability could be defined as
the degree to which human populations and ecological
systems can be affected by external processes caused by
climate change (Adger, Agrawala, & Mirza, 2007). A
widely accepted observation is that vulnerability is a func-
tion of exposure (the rate and degree of climate impacts),
sensitivity (the degree to which a system can be affected
by them), and adaptive capacity (the system’s ability to
adapt to these impacts) (Adger et al., 2003; Chishakwe,
Murray, & Chambwera, 2012; Williamson, Hesseln, &
Johnston, 2012). Analysing vulnerability as a conjuncture
of these three variables allows to bring out the differences
between the biophysical (hazards-centred) and social
approaches.
Using the definition of the above, it can be argued that
the hazards school places emphasis on the exposure of a
local community to such natural processes as droughts,
floods, hurricanes, sea-level rise, and other climate
hazards. This approach separates the social and natural
worlds ontologically and consequently considers them
independent of each other (Schlosberg, 2012; Taylor,
2014; Weisser, Bollig, Doevenspeck, & Müller-Mahn,
2014). It is the interaction between these two discrete
realms, and more specifically the forces of the latter
acting on the former, that can result in negative outcomes
for local people (Bassett & Fogelman, 2013; Shuhrke,
2013). In other words, the vulnerability of a community
is expressed by the degree to which its geographic location
and the related anticipated impacts of climate change can
affect the pre-disaster equilibrium. Attention is placed
here on the amount of damage that can be sustained by a
local community rather than the factors that underpin the
extent of that damage (Adger et al., 2004). In short, analys-
ing vulnerability from this perspective translates into
describing disasters as adverse weather events triggered
by climate change to which humans must react in order
to survive (Head, 2010).
The remedial actions prescribed by approaches that
conceptualize risks in terms of natural hazards have in con-
sequence been focused on limiting the exposure of
vulnerable populations to adverse weather events. Bassett
and Fogelman (2013) refer here to “purposeful adjust-
ments” undertaken by society to increase its absorptive
capacity (or the capacity to absorb external shocks),
while Pelling (2011) classifies this kind of adaptation
simply as “resilience.” Examples include the introduction
of new seed varieties as an adaptive measure against
droughts, constructing walls to protect coastal communities
from sea-level rise, or building levies and resettling people
in anticipation of more frequent and intense flood events.
The said populations’ socio-economic context or capacity
to respond to the risk are not considered significant
factors in decreasing their own vulnerability.
Since the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Fourth Assessment Report of 2007, adaptation research
and practice have accorded increasing attention to social
vulnerability, which concerns the social and economic
determinants of the risks of undergoing climatic stress
(Adger et al., 2004). This has come from the realization
that climate-related risks are a product of “social amplifica-
tion more than the nature of the hazard itself” (Mertz et al.,
2009; Pelling, 2011, p. 16). In addition to addressing
exposure to droughts, floods, or sea-level rise, a more criti-
cal political economy approach has emerged that points to
the socio-economic realities of vulnerable populations as
factors conducive to successful climate change adaptation.
Rather than exposure to climate hazards, efforts to reduce
social vulnerability stress the importance of decreasing
the sensitivity and strengthening the adaptive capacity of
local communities, the other two variables in the function
that describes vulnerability (Adger et al., 2004; Park,
Howden, & Crimp, 2012).
Due to the high diversity of adaptation challenges,
adaptive capacity is very context-specific, and no single
formula for building it exists (Sovacool, 2011). Authors
cite a plethora of different characteristics, stressing the
role of infrastructural, institutional, community, social, pol-
itical, demographic, economic, educational, health, techno-
logical, and cognitive factors in influencing the capacity of
communities to adapt to adverse climate effects (for recent
contributions, see, Adger et al., 2007; Bowen, Cochrane, &
Fankhauser, 2012; Chishakwe et al., 2012; Esham & Gar-
forth, 2013; Lata & Nunn, 2012; Leal Filho, 2011; McNa-
mara, 2013; Pelling, 2011; Picketts et al., 2012; Pulhin,
Lasco, Pulhin, Ramos, & Peras, 2010; Rawlani & Sova-
cool, 2011; Sovacool, D’Agostino, Meenawat, &
Rawlani, 2012; Wolf, Adger, Lorenzoni, Abrahamson, &
Raine, 2010). What all these recommendations have in
common is the recognition that vulnerability in society
exists independently from the biophysical forces to which
it may be subjected, and that limits to adaptation are in
fact cultural, social, and political by nature (Adger et al.,
2004; Pelling, 2011).
Arguably, one of the most significant contributions of
social vulnerability research is the recognition that due to
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the social, economic, cultural, and political stratifications
operating on the ground, adaptation to climate change has
the potential to leave some people behind while others
manage to steer their livelihoods towards a more
“climate-proof” future (Gentle & Maraseni, 2012). Critical
scholars studying what has come to be known as climate
justice have cautioned that individual and collective
actions taken locally in response to climate change are
likely to produce “winners and losers” of adaptation
(Adger, 2001, 2003, 2006; Adger et al., 2004; Thomas &
Twyman, 2005). In other words, local distributions of
power and material assets are likely to be rearranged not
only by droughts, floods, and sea-level rise, but also
more indirectly by the way in which people respond to
these occurrences.
Importantly, it is argued that the most vulnerable
people in developing countries, such as the poor and the
marginalized, will be hit hardest due to their limited
resource base and chronic social exclusion (Shrestha,
2013). As a result, such inequitable climate change adap-
tation could potentially exacerbate socio-economic
inequalities at the national, sub-national, and community
levels, constituting a serious obstacle to broadly under-
stood inclusive development, itself. That adaptation
policy and practice may benefit the privileged while
leaving the marginalized behind due to socio-economic
stratification has become one of the main concerns of criti-
cal adaptation scholarship (Adger, 2003; Adger et al.,
2003, 2004; Adger, Brown, & Tompkins, 2005;
Neumann, 2005; Ribot, 2009; Taylor, 2014; Thomas &
Twyman, 2005).
Top-down and bottom-up approaches
While the first dimension of adaptation interventions con-
cerns the nature of vulnerability that is being addressed,
the second dimension expresses the modality in which
these interventions are implemented. Here, one can dis-
tinguish between top-down and bottom-up approaches to
local adaptation efforts.
Top-down (or planned) adaptation comprises a range of
external interventions that have the aim of protecting the
livelihoods of local people and facilitating the ways in
which they respond to climate change. It is argued that
facilitating adaptation, particularly in developing countries,
has become a necessity due to the sheer scope of current
and anticipated climate impacts and their low adaptive
capacity (Adger, 2003). According to this argument,
current local knowledge and practices will not be able to
compensate for the severity of climate impacts that are in
store for many vulnerable people, and that developing
countries require financial and technological assistance
from the outside to prepare for adverse climate effects.
Importantly, it has been observed that top-down adap-
tation is strongly informed by the hazards approach.
Indeed, the framing of adaptation as a necessity to adjust
to the natural hazard of climate change is conducive to
putting forth solutions that involve corrective, top-down,
technical, and carefully managed measures as answers to
local adaptation challenges (Bryant, 1997; Shuhrke,
2013; Tschakert & Machado, 2012). Grounded in the con-
fidence in science, technology, and rationality, this kind of
techno-managerial adaptation promotes “disaster prepared-
ness” through standardized governance and planning
systems (Brown, 2011, p. 28; Chishakwe et al., 2012;
Symons, 2014; Tanner & Allouche, 2011). Consequently,
this approach often relies on the construction of artificial,
human-built infrastructure (such as coastal protection)
and other sizeable technological solutions, as well as low-
resolution modelling, and government interventions
through various laws and programmes (Ayers & Forsyth,
2009; Chishakwe et al., 2012; Sovacool, 2011). It requires
significant financial assets as the bulk of funds are con-
sumed by infrastructural development (Sovacool, 2011).
It largely ignores the social and political drivers of vulner-
ability and focuses on populations’ exposure to climate
effects.
That said, top-down adaptation measures focusing on
social vulnerability also exist, and can include social
support programmes concerned with literacy, public and
environmental health, as well as material redistribution
(United Nations, 2011). It can also be argued that interven-
tions that advocate for increased physical and social access
of local communities to markets in order to foster income-
generating economic activities, despite widely presenting
themselves as participatory or bottom-up, are essentially
top-down by nature (Moore, 2004; Taylor, 2014).
On the other hand, the majority of bottom-up (or parti-
cipatory) approaches to adaptation intervention tend to
focus on social vulnerability rather than climate impacts
as natural hazards, and draw from the tradition of institu-
tionalism, which advocates for the creation of institutions
capable of generating collective action at the community
level (Cundill & Fabricius, 2010; Menzel & Buchecker,
2013). It must be underscored at this point that these parti-
cipatory approaches should not be equated with democrati-
zation efforts. Interventions based on local institutions do
not generally engage with issues of power and democracy,
despite being founded on the principle of involving local
people in the design, implementation and, less frequently,
monitoring of adaptation or development interventions.
Rather, bottom-up approaches of this kind tend to stress
the importance of community as the social mobilization
instrument that is required for the successful management
of community resources (Delanty, 2010). That is because
the ability of local communities to make decisions and
act on them collectively is viewed by many bottom-up
adaptation interventions as one of the most important
factors for increasing adaptive capacity (Adger, 2003;
Adger et al., 2004; Allen, 2006; Rudd, 2000). The
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importance of collective action stems from the fact that
managing natural resources together spreads the costs and
benefits of access to these resources across the wider com-
munity, reducing the risk of conflict and bettering the live-
lihoods of those involved (Ostrom, 1990). In particular,
scholars of the sociological and institutional persuasion
seek to analyse why and how individuals and social
groups engage in collective action and what the intrinsic
dynamics of the process are.
Community-based adaptation
In the specific context of adaptation to climate change, the
most widely cited bottom-up approach to facilitating local
responses to climate risks is “community-based adaptation”
(CBA) (Ayers & Forsyth, 2009; Dodman & Mitlin, 2013;
Faulkner, Ayers, & Huq, 2015; McNamara, 2013; Parashar,
Sharma, & Shaw, 2011; Simane & Zaitchik, 2014). CBA has
been described as a response to the mixed success record of
the top-down approach delineated above, which failed to
integrate adaptation and development in ways that address
the social complexity and diversity of adaptation contexts
(Chishakwe et al., 2012; Faulkner et al., 2015). CBA does
not advocate for specific solutions to adaptation challenges
on the ground. Rather, it hopes to co-produce these solutions
with the beneficiaries themselves.
Precisely because of its commitment to include local
people in the decision-making and implementation pro-
cesses, CBA rests on the cohesion of local communities
and stresses the importance of the livelihoods of the
people who compose them (Sovacool, D’Agostino,
Rawlani, & Meenawat, 2012). As a largely institutional
approach, CBA-based interventions are often dependent
on their ability to create efficient and inclusive local-level
institutions (Andersson & Gabrielsson, 2012; Rudd,
2000; Shatkin, 2007). CBA utilizes participatory methods
to benefit from unique local knowledge and strategies in
designing adaptation measures; it is supposed to be not
just community-based but also community-driven
(Chishakwe et al., 2012; Pelling, 2011). As a result, the
communities affected by climate change are thought to
become empowered and act as decision-makers, implemen-
ters, and monitors of their own adaptation (Allen, 2006;
McNamara, 2013; OECD, 2012; Picketts et al., 2012;
Sovacool, 2011). Consequently, CBA has a higher legiti-
macy potential as it takes into consideration the values,
feelings, traditions, and emotions that the top-down
approach fails to include in local-level decision-making
(Pelling, 2011).
The typology of adaptation approaches presented above
is an attempt to systematically analyse the current efforts
aimed at “preparing” local communities in the Global
South to climate change. What needs to be underlined
here is that the different types of adaptation described
above are not discrete or mutually exclusive. Different
interventions may – and more often than not do –
contain elements rooted in both social and exposure-
based understandings of the causes of vulnerability and,
furthermore, can mobilize both top-down and bottom-up
strategies. For example, adaptation projects financed
under the United National Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) funding mechanisms tend
to include elements aimed at building stronger national
and local institutions, constructing climate-resilient infra-
structure, and fostering CBA initiatives on the ground
(Sovacool et al., 2012; UNDP, 2014). Table 1 lists
examples of interventions arranged according to the two
adaptation dimensions delineated above. Autonomous
strategies are provided only for reference, as they are
expected to take place independently from or in the
absence of adaptation interventions.
A critique of the hazards and social vulnerability
approaches in research and practice
Top-down adaptation has faced consistent criticism from
adaptation scholars (Ayers & Forsyth, 2009; Figueiredo
& Perkins, 2013; Parashar et al., 2011; Tschakert &
Machado, 2012). It is argued that the imposition of what
are essentially top-down solutions under a process that is
described by donors and intervention implementers as
explicitly democratic or participatory has little to do with
meaningful participation, not to mention democracy
(Kenis & Lievens, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010). It has
been argued that the technocratic bias of this approach
can undermine local adaptation by ignoring community
capacity and the reasons for its decline (Fu et al., 2012;
McNamara, 2013; Pelling, 2011). Moreover, the excessive
reliance of the top-down approach on cost-benefit analysis
is of little use in the context of adaptation, as the goal of
adaptation projects is to prevent losses from happening,
which by definition makes these potential costs hard to
quantify (Pelling, 2011). In general, adaptation research
focused on social vulnerability has provided an ample cri-
tique on the limitations of interventions concerned chiefly
with biophysical climate factors and their impacts on
local communities.
Yet, institutional and participatory approaches to adap-
tation such as CBA are not without challenges and have
also attracted criticism. It is argued that, while theoretically
attractive, inducing and maintaining “reflective community
engagement” in practice is an arduous and time-intensive
project (McNamara, 2013, p. 399). Moreover, because par-
ticipatory approaches such as CBA are relatively cheaper,
they may tend to substitute, rather than complement,
more capital-intensive adaptation strategies such as infra-
structure or technological development that in many cases
may be necessary for successful adaptation to take off (Chi-
veralls, 2012; Dodman & Mitlin, 2013). By doing so, com-
munity-based approaches may have the unintended
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consequence of devolving the responsibility for adaptation
onto the poor themselves (McCarthy, 2014).
However, a critique that arguably carries the most
serious consequences for local communities is that partici-
patory approaches that rely too much on internal social
dynamics within heterogeneous communities can reinforce
their underlying power structures and result in the repro-
duction of intra-community patterns of exclusion, oppres-
sion, and vulnerability (Allen, 2006; McCarthy, 2014).
The uncritical focus on institutions such as local associ-
ations and organizations, and their undisputed positive
effect on collective action and adaptive capacity, rests on
unrealistic assumptions about local communities’ absolute
power equality and their independence of the external pol-
itical-economic forces (Mosse, 2006; Wilson, Acheson, &
Johnson, 2013). As Chiveralls (2012, p. 138) argues with
regard to adaptation approaches centred on fostering
social capital, the rational choice framework that such
initiatives rest upon “denies the inherent complexity and
contingency of social life and the power struggles with
which it is imbued.” This is to say that local communities
are not perfectly rational, competitive and self-sufficient
markets, but rather highly differentiated and messy entities
filled with relations of domination and exclusion (Wilson
et al., 2013). In short, institutional theory is based on ideal-
ized assumptions of reality.
This may help explain why institutional strategies
aimed at decreasing social vulnerability lack any rigorous
considerations of power. This is a major gap, especially
given the many voices lamenting the preponderance of apo-
litical approaches to adaptation (Bassett & Fogelman,
2013; Peet, Robbins, & Watts, 2011; Pelling, 2011;
Shuhrke, 2013; Tanner & Allouche, 2011). While gener-
ously acknowledged, unequal power structures are often
taken for granted and considered static, rather than con-
stantly negotiated, perpetuated, and acted upon. They act
as a “backdrop,” a hurdle, to the community engineering
of the kind described above that seeks to realign commu-
nity life to produce mutually beneficial collective outcomes
(Brennan & Israel, 2008, p. 89). Institutional strategies that
place emphasis on self-governance, often in tandem with
market forces, operate on the basis of the romantic under-
standing of communities that ignores internal power differ-
entials and presents them as uniform, idyllic entities
naturally engaging in collective action (Cohen, 1985;
Evans, 2009; Young & Gert, 1986). Arguably, the ques-
tions of political power and political inequality in the
context of adaptation to climate change have failed to
solicit rigorous theoretical and empirical engagement
within academia.
The inability of adaptation research and practice to sys-
tematically engage with power and inequality sets the stage
for adaptation interventions that may work for some, but at
the same time leave others, and presumably the poor and
the most marginalized, behind. It thus contributes to the
already mentioned process that produces winners and
losers of adaptation (Adger, 2003; Adger et al., 2003,
2004, 2005; Neumann, 2005; Thomas & Twyman, 2005).
Meanwhile, climate change impacts are real and are affect-
ing people around the planet now (Swyngedouw, 2013a).
While biophysical forces and socio-economic challenges
on the ground are essential in studying these impacts, tra-
ditional approaches to adaptation should be supplemented
by frameworks that bring to the fore the ways in which
power affects adaptation choices and outcomes. It is the
intellectual responsibility of academics and policy-makers
to ensure that human responses to slowly intensifying
climate impacts such as droughts, floods, and sea-level
rise are as equitable and democratic as possible. Otherwise,
unequal adaptation may serve as an occasion for increasing
stratification of local communities, a process that may
undermine inclusive development, let alone effective
responses to climate change (McCarthy, 2014; Taylor,
2014). In light of these concerns, the next section will
Table 1. Examples of adaptation interventions according to the cause of damage and modality of intervention.
Cause of damage
Natural Social






























Note: Conceptualizing vulnerability as having roots in political inequality should complement the dominant socio-economic approach.
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attempt to delineate the theoretical foundations for analys-
ing how power relations affect the adaptations of local com-
munities to climate change.
Politicizing vulnerability and adaptation to climate
impacts
Critical vulnerability scholars have proposed that while
moving away from hazards-centred approaches to studying
the impacts of climate change on local communities is a
step in the right direction, simply describing the socio-
economic attributes that are seen as causal factors of vul-
nerability (such as poverty) is insufficient and inadequate
(Eriksen et al., 2015; Ribot, 2014; Sen, 1984). In analysing
vulnerability to climate change, and by extension planning
various interventions aimed to address it, one must ask
about, following Ribot (2014), the root causes of vulner-
ability. Indeed, asking why vulnerability exists rather than
merely demonstrating how it manifests itself is a key
analytical shift that should occur not just in social climate
science but any research concerned with social justice
and inequality.
For example, land tenure is a valid determinant of vul-
nerability to climate change impacts, as secure access to
land is seen as one of the key factors that increase
people’s adaptive capacity (Pulhin et al., 2010). A simple
recognition of this fact, however, does not get us far. In
this specific example, an interrogation is required into the
causes of insecure land tenure if any intervention is to suc-
cessfully decrease vulnerability (Ribot, 2014). Such
interrogation involves questioning the power asymmetries
that have led to and, more importantly, constantly reinforce
the inequality in access to land, moving the inquiry into the
realm of political economy and critical social theory. As
such, it politicizes both vulnerability (in the sense that it
traces its roots to explicitly political processes) and, by
extension, adaptation to climate change (which it views
as a political process taken in response to climate
impacts). Shifting the focus away from poverty, lack of
capacity, low levels of education and high unemployment
rates – as important as these issues are – to questions of
power and politics, and how these latter concepts shape
vulnerability and the adaptive process itself, I argue, pro-
vides a more nuanced understanding of why some local
people remain vulnerable to climate impacts while others
manage to adapt. Thus, it is the political inequality of the
studied places, rather than their well-researched socio-
economic inequality, that is viewed as a key determinant
of vulnerability. In short, local vulnerability and adaptation,
rather than just social, are explicitly political by nature
(Eriksen et al., 2015; Nightingale, 2015; Taylor, 2014).
Yet, Brennan and Israel (2008, p. 82) notice that “despite
its central role in community, regional, and national life, the
concept of power remains underdeveloped in the community
theory literature.” Indeed, power is certainly acknowledged
as a factor in community-level decision-making, but is
often mentioned in passing without conceptual rigour.
More often than not, it is simply considered a condition
that stems from the economic, social, or political position
(Brennan & Israel, 2008). For the purposes of this discus-
sion, I will follow Brennan and Israel’s (2008, p. 82) defi-
nition of power as “the ability to act or influence the
ability of others to either act or choose a path of inaction.”
I understand this definition in both material and discursive
terms. Although the authors develop the concept further by
distinguishing between different dimensions of power such
as threat, authority, influence, manipulation, and force
(Brennan & Israel, 2008), the following sections will
combine the elements of these dimensions through the
general use of the term power.
In order to facilitate the analysis of power and the
resulting politics in the context of adaptation to climate
change, a focus on the root causes of people’s inability to
participate in adaptation decisions and benefit from their
outcomes moves the discussion on vulnerability and the
resulting ability to adapt to climate change impacts into
the realm of power and politics (Ribot, 2014). The goal
here is to uncover how a complex web of power structures
and relations shape and are shaped by adaptive actions. The
need for this exercise is supported by findings of the limited
empirical research concerned with political roots of vulner-
ability. For example, it has been suggested that local vul-
nerability to climate change impacts is not caused by the
retreating glaciers or poverty, but rather by an unequal
access to water governance (Lynch, 2012). In the Global
North context, the issue was particularly visible by the
post-disaster experience of politically marginalized min-
orities in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina
(Smith, 2006; Somers, 2008).
It is proposed that unequal relations of power in adap-
tation contexts can be analysed in a twofold way. The first
question to be asked is how power functions at the intra-
community level among community groups2 or individual
members. Second, since communities do not function inde-
pendently of the larger political, economic, and social pro-
cesses, the influence of external agents that facilitate
adaptation through either top-down or bottom-up
approaches must complement power analysis in the
context of local communities.3 The flows of both material
and discursive power at these two levels are not always
independent from each other. For instance, local elites
can ally themselves with outside forces to change the
shape of locally taken decisions to their own benefit
(Brosius, Tsing, & Zerner, 1998; Mehta, 2000; Nuesiri,
2015).
Understanding intra-community inequalities
First, with regards to the intra-community level, it can be
argued that power is most visibly exercised through the
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process of decision-making within the community, and that
power is crucial to the selection and implementation of the
decisions taken. As Peters (1996) notes, participation in
community life is a political process and involves contesta-
tion or conflict between different interests. In that sense, the
amount of power (both discursive and material) that groups
and individuals bear can be distilled down to their ability to
influence community politics. The individuals or groups
who possess superior power determine the structure and
decisions of the community (Ishihara & Pascual, 2009),
and conversely, the powerless are excluded from or other-
wise side-lined in the process of making collective
decisions. It is at this moment that the asymmetries of
power become most visible (Eriksen et al., 2015; Ishihara
& Pascual, 2009).
The reasons why certain members may be able to par-
ticipate in community politics more than others are very
diverse, and can be tied to social and economic attributes
such as wealth, gender, caste, ethnicity, prestige, or occu-
pation. Thus, power should be analysed with a focus on
both its material and discursive dimensions. First, power
can be drawn from more economic (or material) attributes
such as wealth or occupation. If one understands vulner-
ability in relational terms (Taylor, 2013), it becomes clear
that the low vulnerability of some people can come at the
expense of the high vulnerability of others, and that the
adaptations of the former may, both in terms of their per-
ceptions and effects, constitute maladaptations for the
latter. Taylor (2014) provides a wealth of examples on
how adaptation is, indeed, a vehicle for capital accumu-
lation for agrarian elites who exercise power through
patron–client relations with other community members
due to their superior wealth and material status, in general.
In more discursive terms, Eriksen et al. (2015) propose
analysing the use of power in the context of adaptation by
drawing from three concepts from social theory: authority,
knowledge, and subjectivity. The approach goes beyond
interrogating what kinds of decisions are made and by
whom, and asks why certain individuals are able to
promote their understandings and interests more effectively
than others. Obviously, this process is not limited to how
people respond to climate impacts. The contestation of
different subjectivities by using authority to legitimise
specific kinds of knowledge happens anytime groups of
actors are subjected to change. The point to be made here
is that adaptation, as a clearly political process, is
embedded within the existing intra-community power
relations rather than being detached from them. As such,
it is likely to produce inequitable outcomes caused by the
actions of those who are more powerful in establishing
their particularistic agenda as the agenda of the entire com-
munity. For example, certain groups and individuals may
draw power from traditional sources of authority, and this
is the case of elders, village chiefs, or religious figures
(Ribot, 2000; Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003). As such, they
can use this authority to influence the collective subjectivity
of the community, which inevitably leads to the silencing of
certain kinds of knowledge in favour of others (Foucault &
Senellart, 2008; Ishihara & Pascual, 2009). Socially insti-
tuted cultural norms also play an important role, such as
the predominant role of men in the decision-making
process in many traditional rural communities, or patriar-
chy (Bandiaky, 2008; Edvardsson Björnberg & Hansson,
2013; Jusrut, 2015; Nightingale, 2015; Ribot, 2000). This
power play must not be ignored by those wishing to under-
stand how adaptation unfolds on the ground.
What follows from this kind of approach to adaptation
is a change in the way academics and practitioners should
conceptualize and relate to local communities in their
work. Rather than understanding community in idyllic
terms, where the local populace is economically self-suffi-
cient and organized through local and consensual decision-
making, community needs to be perceived as a form of
social organization with power structures that often result
in relations of domination and exclusion (Bridger &
Luloff, 1999; Brosius et al., 1998; Kellert, Mehta, Ebbin,
& Lichtenfeld, 2000; Taylor, 2014; Turner, 1999; Watts,
2004). In the practical sphere, a shift is required in the
understanding of communities when formulating and
implementing adaptation policies and projects.
Understanding the power differentials between local
communities and interventions
Second, attention should be paid to outsiders’ influence on
the ability of local communities to adapt to climate change
in an equitable manner (Poteete & Ribot, 2011). In this
case, the role of external development and adaptation
agents such as NGOs, national institutions, or international
organizations, should be scrutinized in terms of how much
power they bear relative to the recipients of their assistance.
The modality of adaptation governance at the local level as
it is promoted by external actors, and most prominently
development agencies, can be described as intrinsically
post-democratic (Swyngedouw, 2011; Wilson & Swynge-
douw, 2014). The choice of adaptation solutions is a
highly political issue, since what counts as an effective or
desired adaptation strategy is highly contestable (Eriksen
et al., 2015). Since many adaptation or vulnerability-
centred interventions are based on techno-managerial
expertise where climate science and classical economics
are used to justify the proposed solutions, local commu-
nities’ role in the process is reduced to that of mere recipi-
ents of help rather than partners in shaping their own
adaptation. Power, in this case, manifests itself through
the more or less visible imposition of a victim subjectivity
on local people.
An example of how outside adaptation, however well-
meaning, can effectively disempower rather than empower
local communities, are many adaptation and mitigation
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projects funded under the UNFCCC adaptation governance
structure. While a participatory approach involving stake-
holders is usually a condition for project approval and
funding (UNFCCC, 2014), these initiatives have been
accused of being irresponsive to local views, institutions,
and circumstances (Chishakwe et al., 2012; Fortier, 2010;
Hiraldo, 2015; Kashwan, 2014; Mandondo & Jusrut,
2015; Marfo, 2015; Nuesiri, 2015; Pulhin et al., 2010). Sta-
keholder participation is built into the design of all such
projects, and participatory meetings with the affected com-
munities do take place at various stages of preparation and
implementation. However, at the same time, the scope of
these meetings is defined from the outset, and issues that
fall outside the pre-determined range of acceptable frames
of decision-making are ignored (Adger, 2006; Fortier,
2010; Hughes, 2013). Participation in this case becomes a
rhetoric of external agencies that fail to achieve real invol-
vement of all community members (Peters, 1996). Instead,
they rely on pre-designed solutions based on technical
expertise and climate science. Because such projects tend
to ignore the local power structures of the kind described
above, they may end up benefitting certain groups or
members, usually the most powerful, rather than the
entire community (Bridger & Luloff, 1999; Ribot, 2000).
In these cases, externally facilitated empowerment
becomes a highly selective process that reinforces the exist-
ing power structures and contributes to growing inequality
through the process of adaptation to climate change.
Towards democratizing adaptation
Critical scholars have theorized how to account for these
considerations in studying and promoting adaptation to
climate change at the local level. One fundamental question
is whether the assumption that power stems from socio-
economic status means that policies should – by extension
– seek to alter the existing socio-economic foundations of
local communities. Even if that were the policy goal, the
potential for its realization remains highly dubious. Given
the experience to date, it may be unreasonable to expect
adaptation to climate change to become a force for levelling
the social “playing field.” Suggestions for aggressive pol-
icies of material – not to mention cultural – redistribution
are likely to fall on deaf ears of governments and aid
agencies. (A critically inclined observer concerned with
power would most likely argue that this is due to their
reluctance to share it!) Rather, in order to be applicable,
research and policy must for now work with the existing
socio-economic inequalities of the kinds mentioned
earlier and ensure adaptation avoids exacerbating them
further. As Taylor (2014, p. 160) pointedly notes: “Adap-
tation cannot ignore… [the] social relations within which
biophysical forces are embedded – climate change cannot
in any meaningful way become separated out from a redis-
tribution of power within the agrarian environment.”
In light of these considerations, the overarching consen-
sus that seems to have been reached so far is that local adap-
tation governance must become democratized in a way that
has not been done to date (Kenis &Mathijs, 2014; Marino &
Ribot, 2012; McCarthy, 2014; Mehta, 2000; Peters, 1996;
Ribot, 2000; Swyngedouw, 2011, 2013b). As Ribot (2014,
p. 669) argues when theorizing vulnerability to climate
impacts, “[d]emocracy must be integrated into any full
analysis of causality.” Importantly, democratization of the
local decision-making process – both with regard to external
and internal actors – does not negate the existence of socio-
economic inequalities within local communities. It does not
seek to actively engineer a community’s internal structure to
foster collective action, either. Rather, its goal as a process is
to achieve a more equitable distribution of power within
communities (Swyngedouw, 2013b). To that end, scholars
speak of ensuring representation and rights (McCarthy,
2014; Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999) as well as insti-
tutional recognition (Faye, 2015; Ribot, Chhatre, & Lankina,
2008), promoting inclusiveness and accountability (United
Nations, 2011), pursuing meaningful participation of all
community members (Peters, 1996), and bringing out the
adversarial nature of political deliberation in the decision-
making process (Kamat, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Swyngedouw,
2011).
More specifically, the democratization of adaptation
governance should prioritize the predicament of the poor
and marginalized, since those are the least likely to
benefit from (and conversely, the most likely to be disad-
vantaged by) climate change and adaptation to climate
change alike. In this context, increasing their political rep-
resentation and supporting their authority in the political
process become natural goals of adaptation research and
practice (Marino & Ribot, 2012; Mehta, 2000). Affirmative
measures aimed at including members of disadvantaged
groups, such as women, are presented as potential strategies
to help achieve that goal (Agarwal, 2010; Kashwan, 2014;
Ruta, 2015).
Democratization of adaptation would then naturally
aim at addressing the political roots of the vulnerability
of a given local community. This is because interpreted
this way, vulnerability stems from the unequal distribution
of power either among different community groups or
members, or between local communities and the initiatives
aimed at increasing their adaptive capacity. Table 1 demon-
strates how a more political reading of vulnerability could
be integrated into the existing framework using both top-
down and bottom-up approaches discussed earlier. The
former concern efforts towards designing and implement-
ing adaptation interventions in such a way as to shift the
power balance within these initiatives towards their own
beneficiaries. This would open up more space for demo-
cratic deliberation between adaptation projects or pro-
grammes and local communities, an issue that has been at
the centre of attention of critical development and
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adaptation scholars. It could help address the problem of
interventions consistently ignoring the needs, values, and
goals of local people.
In this context, what seems to be key is the concern over
whether representation of communities in local institutions
(either the existing ones or those created specifically for the
purposes of the intervention) actually results in the rep-
resentation of all community members. Creating and main-
taining democratic institutions that aim to represent the
interests of a community may be extremely challenging,
just as it is problematic to speak of a collective community
interest to begin with. Ribot (cited in Kashwan, 2014, p. 8)
defines representation as a “correspondence between citi-
zens’ interests and the policies so that ‘leaders are both
responsive and accountable to the people’” (also see, Prze-
worski et al., 1999). However, as Kashwan (2014) notices,
representation in this sense may not be sufficient as it
requires a considerable amount of political agency that
some individuals may, for the reasons delineated above,
simply lack. Interventions based on institutional
approaches to fostering adaptive capacity tend to ignore
this nuance, and despite providing an opportunity to partici-
pate to all, they often end up furthering the interests and
agendas of some.
A study on the National Adaptation Programmes of
Action (NAPA) priority projects funded under UNFCCC
funding mechanisms provides evidence on what such toke-
nistic representation means on the ground. The results have
shown that 85% of the projects pay little to no attention to
local institutions, limiting their effectiveness and legiti-
macy (Chishakwe et al., 2012). Other studies arrive at
similar conclusions (Kenis & Lievens, 2014; Manuel-
Navarrete, Pelling, & Redclift, 2011; Nuesiri, 2015;
Ribot, 2000). Meanwhile, interventions that are chosen
democratically by local communities have a proven
record of being more widely adopted and sustainable com-
pared to those imposed by external decision-makers (Loo,
2014; Reed et al., 2013; Uphoff, 2000). Additional research
into how the interplay between intervention implementers
and beneficiaries could be democratized on the ground is
required. However, the point to be made here is that adap-
tation initiatives need to be designed and implemented with
local communities as partners rather than beneficiaries. As
Eriksen et al. (2015, p. 526) pointedly note, “[r]ather than
enhancing participation of vulnerable groups in adaptation
processes designed by powerful groups, there is a need for
co-production of these processes by the vulnerable.” Other-
wise, their involvement in such efforts amounts to empty
rhetoric that only gives illusions of power to the people
who need it the most (Marfo, 2015; Mbeche, 2015;
Nuesiri, 2015; Peters, 2000).
The issue of democratizing the structure and function-
ing of development and adaptation interventions has a lit-
erature of its own. However, even an adaptation project
or programme which creates a perfect power balance
(however that balance is defined) between itself and the
community will have little chance to succeed in reducing
vulnerability in an equitable manner if it ignores the
intra-community relations that affect different individuals’
ability to participate in and benefit from the activities
undertaken on the ground. As a result, a more bottom-up
approach needs to complement the democratization of
adaptation intervention itself, and should be based on
assisting communities in creating spaces of political delib-
eration that are conducive to inclusive and equitable
decision-making and distribution of benefits. Communities
are, as was already noted above, wrought with uncounted
inequalities for social, cultural, economic, or other
reasons. They are not communal idylls awaiting resources
from outside interveners that will transform them into
climate-proof populations. On the contrary, they can be
understood as theatres of inequality, conflict, patriarchy,
and sometimes outright exploitation and oppression
(Delanty, 2010; Peters, 1996). Just as in the case of local
communities’ relationship with outside actors where differ-
ent kinds of knowledge and authority produce and repro-
duce specific subjectivities with regards to adaptation
needs and solutions, a similar process happens at the com-
munity level, with the interests, views, and emotions of
some individuals prevailing over those of others.
The question on how precisely an adaptation interven-
tion could tackle this kind of inequality on the ground is
perhaps one of the key problems that critical adaptation
research has to address. And it is a formidably complicated
one. On the one hand, ignoring local power differentials by
looking the other way is almost inevitably going to benefit
certain community individuals and groups (i.e. elites), with
the concomitant exclusion of, and perhaps even at the
expense of other, less powerful ones (Ruta, 2015). In this
way, local inequalities and vulnerabilities would not only
be ignored but also reinforced. An example would be
failing to address the issue of gender differences in access
to decision-making where women have been traditionally
excluded from positions of power (Bandiaky, 2008; Night-
ingale, 2015). This would further exacerbate the impact of
climate change on women, who are already being affected
by it in a disproportionate manner (Edvardsson Björnberg
& Hansson, 2013; Parikh, Upadhyay, & Singh, 2012;
Ruta, 2015; Tschakert & Machado, 2012).
On the other hand, any attempts to alter cultural norms
and traditions of the communities in question would invoke
cultural-relativist and neo-colonial critiques arguing that
altering the social and political make-up of communities
in the Global South to suit an initiative most likely
funded by Western donors bears resemblance to the work-
ings of colonial overlords (Ribot, 2000). This, however,
would be the case of communities unwilling to alter their
internal power structures. It is plausible that others would
welcome assistance in solving power inequality issues
and democratizing their own decision-making mechanisms.
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It must be remembered that while exclusively top-down
approaches have meagre chances to successfully address
local adaptation challenges, bottom-up ones with little or
no external assistance (in the form of financial resources
or knowledge, for example) also disempower local commu-
nities by depriving them of the opportunity to improve their
adaptive capacity through the co-production of solutions
with outside actors. Moreover, above and beyond providing
communities with information on the predicted local
climate impacts and the potential solutions – information
many communities may simply lack – researchers could
work with local communities that request assistance to the-
orize and identify the ways in which power relations may
affect the selected adaptive strategies, and work together
to address them. Thus, top-down approaches should not
be rejected in their entirety, especially since democratiza-
tion can itself be understood as a top-down measure intro-
duced to create institutional instruments for bottom-up
action at the local level.
However, these prescriptions are for now just that –
goals to be achieved rather than strategies through which
to achieve them. Democratization is a difficult task. In
Peters’ (1996) words, “participation is not a technique but
an ideal,” and the same can be said about democracy. Adap-
tation to climate change is highly contextual and depends
on a multitude of local variables such as the socio-econ-
omic composition of the community and the resulting
local power structure, its local traditions, norms, and
customs, and its linkages to and situation relative to
outside power centres such as development agencies, the
market or the government. Adaptation policy will not be
able to produce and rely on a one-size-fits-all solution
because uncertainty and complexity are permanently
inscribed into adaptation to climate change (Hilde, 2012).
Democratization – as a goal both more ambitious and
more appropriate than participation – is seen as the only
process that has the potential to tackle these caveats and
prevent adaptation from stratifying local communities
further (Eriksen et al., 2015).
Practical considerations for adaptation
democratization research and practice
In this context, the question to be asked here is on the role
the already discussed CBA approach could play in demo-
cratizing governance. CBA certainly is a step in the right
direction, as it aims to shift the power to shape adaptations
from outside actors such as aid agencies and NGOs to the
individuals whose livelihoods are at stake. One of the
major benefits of CBA, as of other decentralized
approaches to community development, is that the sol-
utions are likely to be better tailored to local contexts
than in the case of the often inadequate, top-down strategies
crafted in distant institutional environments. However, if
adaptations are to be decided and acted upon at the
community level, it must be ensured that all members of
the community are politically involved in an equal
manner despite their diverse socio-economic circum-
stances. This is why CBA cannot be based exclusively on
the institutional frameworks such as those proposed by
Ostrom (1990), which are founded on social interactions,
norms, rules, networks, trust (or social capital) and collec-
tive action. Such approaches simplify the complexity of
community life and as such are insufficient to explain and
facilitate a highly political process that adaptation to
climate change is. The internal power structures within
communities are crucial here and must become priority
for CBA interventions that stress community participation.
On a more methodological level, experience from the
field of development studies delivers several examples of
how power relations could be uncovered and deconstructed
on the ground. One of the most prominent ones is the
approach elaborated by the Swedish International Develop-
ment Agency (SIDA), in which power analysis entails the
mapping of the informal political landscape as well as its
rules and structures (Nash, Hudson, & Luttrell, 2006).
Hydén (2006) provides a detailed account of how such an
analysis could proceed, with data relying on interviews
and document analysis or a survey of power perceptions
within the given social context. Lynch (2012) speaks of
an approach that analyses “bundles of power” that could
help uncover unequal access to decision-making. Other
methodologies for analysing power also exist, and are
designed and implemented by development agencies and
non-governmental organizations, marking a relatively
recent turn in development towards more power-centred
analyses (Dahl-Østergaard, Unsworth, Robinson, &
Jensen, 2005; Mayers, 2005; Nash et al., 2006). In each
of these cases, a focus on the local “patterns of difference”
and the numerous and complex webs of divergent interests
presents itself as an opportunity for designing adaptation
interventions that are better attuned to local contexts and
make sense of the power relations they find on the
ground (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999).
Since the breadth of these contexts is truly formidable,
researchers concerned with power analysis need to decide
what kinds of data collection methods (qualitative vs. quan-
titative) and analytical frameworks are the most appropriate
and potentially available. Power is a very “slippery
concept” (Hydén, 2006, p. 219), and as with any social con-
struct, its measurement or mapping is inherently proble-
matic. However, the theoretical and methodological
complexities described above should not dissuade critical
scholars from actively engaging power and the political
roots of vulnerability in their work. Precisely because adap-
tation to climate change is highly contextual, a wide body
of empirical research is required to provide evidence on
how adaptation decisions are being taken, who is rep-
resented, who benefits, and why. Adaptation is always
embedded within the existing social relations that
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inevitably involve various kinds of power negotiation, con-
testation and conflict, and any serious interrogation of
adaptation cannot ignore these considerations. Unfortu-
nately, this strand of research on adaptation to climate
change is still in its infancy.
Conclusion
This paper attempted to contribute to the ongoing debate on
the necessity to democratize adaptation to climate change.
It has been argued that the current theoretical approaches to
adaptation that rest on exposure to hazards and “apolitical”
vulnerability lack sufficient attention to power as one of the
key determinants of how communities respond to climate
change. While the hazards approach is concerned with
the exposure to adverse weather events such as droughts
and floods, the mainstream social vulnerability approach
foregrounds the socio-economic indicators that make
people vulnerable to such impacts. As a result, the vast
majority of adaptation interventions to-date, either top-
down or bottom-up, have conceptualized vulnerability to
climate change impacts as exposure to a natural hazard or
a socio-economic issue by according insufficient attention
to the political roots of vulnerability (or ignoring them,
altogether). This is, arguably, a serious oversight. The
effect has been policies and interventions that are circum-
scribed in their impacts to building climate-resilient infra-
structure, promoting market-based solutions, or creating
local institutions to foster mutually beneficial collective
action.
This carries the risk of climate change research and
practice being unable to understand why certain groups
of people manage to steer their lives towards a “climate-
proof” future while others are left behind. Adaptation to
climate change is a highly political process that cannot be
reduced to building seawalls or offering livelihood diversi-
fication, a common strategy to address social vulnerability
(Brown, 2011; Owuor, Eriksen, & Mauta, 2005). Instead,
one needs to take a step back and rather than addressing
the various socio-economic manifestations of vulnerability
(poverty, landlessness, etc.), what is necessary is an
interrogation of the origins of vulnerability. Doing so will
reveal that these origins are, in essence, political. An analy-
sis of vulnerability and adaptation in political terms can
help account for power relations affecting adaptation that
the currently dominant approaches fail to address in an ade-
quate manner. It advocates for developing adaptation
research and interventions that are more aware of how com-
munities end up being effectively disenfranchized in
relation to the projects they participate in on the one
hand, and how stratified these communities are internally,
on the other.
In this context, critical social scientists concerned with
adaptation have argued for the democratization of adap-
tation assistance, a stance with which the author of this
paper is very sympathetic. Accounting for the political
nature of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change
requires attention to how power is exercised between
local communities and outside actors, as well as within
these communities – between their leaderships and
members, men and women, young and old people, land
owners and the landless, the abled and the disabled, long-
term residents and recent arrivals, members of different
ethnic groups, and so forth. It should be noted that while
material power asymmetries may be the most visible, the
discursive dimension of this inequality is of equivalent
importance (Marino & Ribot, 2012). It contributes to the
contested creation of subjectivities, knowledge, and auth-
ority (Eriksen et al., 2015), a silent yet highly political
process foregrounds that interventions simply cannot
afford to ignore if their ambition is to promote equitable
adaptation to climate change for everyone, including
those marginalized. Given this extremely complex political
landscape within which adaptation to climate change is
embedded, democratization is seen here as the basis for
any intervention that aims to tackle the political nature of
vulnerability and the process of adaptation itself.
Challenges remain with regard to how exactly this
should be achieved, as local adaptation to climate change
is a highly contextual process that depends on a range of
variables unique to each community and, indeed, interven-
tion (Dodman & Mitlin, 2013; Hilde, 2012; Pelling, 2011).
In the specific context of adaptation to climate change,
empirical research concerned with how and to what
effects power works at the local level is still scarce. A con-
certed effort should be made to produce real-life evidence
on how power affects responses to climate impacts in
local communities, and on the kinds of measures that
lead to more co-productive and equitable adaptation out-
comes in developing countries.
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Notes
1. This relative absence of power in adaptation research mirrors
a similar issue in development practice, which has tradition-
ally refused to tackle the political dynamics affecting on-the-
ground development activities (Hydén, 2006).
2. A caveat must be made in relation to the term “group,” since
just as in any community, group relations may serve as a
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vehicle for their individual members’ emancipation as well as
exclusion and oppression.
3. What should be acknowledged here is the importance of
power relations between local communities and outside
actors and processes, such as the market, the state, NGOs,
development agencies, and other communities, which argu-
ably play a very important role in affecting their adaptive
capacity. However, due to space limitations, this paper con-
cerns the power relations within communities and between
communities and their most immediate development part-
ners. This framework can be easily expanded to account for
larger-scale power flows in the future.
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